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Abstract:  
In his On the Genealogy of Morality Nietzsche famously discusses a psychological condition he 
calls ressentiment, a form of toxic, vengeful anger. In this paper, I offer a free-standing theory 
in philosophical psychology of what is characteristic of this state. My view takes some 
inspiration from Nietzsche, but this paper will not be a work of exegesis. In the process of 
developing my account, I will try to chart the terrain around ressentiment and closely-related 
and sometimes overlapping states (ordinary moral resentment, envy, vengefulness, anger, and 
the like) and also seek to explain what’s ethically objectionable as well as psychologically 
pernicious about ressentiment. Ressentiment, I shall contend in this paper, is not simply a ten 
dollar word substitutable for ‘resentment,’ though it is indeed a species of that genus. On 
the account I develop, the perception of being slighted, insulted, or demeaned figures 
centrally in cases of ressentiment.
I. Introduction 
On May  23,  2014  in  Isla  Vista,  California,  22-year-old  Elliot  Rodger  went  on  a 
shooting  spree,  killing  six  people  and  injuring  fourteen  others.  Shortly  before  this 
murderous rampage, he uploaded a video manifesto to YouTube in which we outlined his 
motivations. In his twisted way, he thought it a cosmic injustice that sorority women were 
spurning him. He wanted revenge and took it in an undiscriminating fashion. A few years 
later, self-styled “white nationalists” marched in Charlottesville, Virginia, chanting “you will 
not replace us”—the “you” referring to other racial groups perceived to be gaining power 
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and status that the white supremacists thought was rightfully theirs. One rammed his car 
into a group of counter-protesters. Sometimes, as in these cases, the toxic grievances issue in 
violent  action,  in  outbursts  of  terrorism.  Sometimes,  as  we see in a  variety  of  forms in 
contemporary political life, these grievances influence one’s voting. Sometimes they lead to 
posturing displays of power or to verbal tirades on Twitter. Sometimes hostility simmers in 
more subterranean ways, in passive-aggression and fantasies of revenge, without anything 
much being done.
We academics  will  be familiar  with milder  and less  dangerous forms of  a  similar 
phenomenon:  Those,  for  example,  who  feel  (justly  or  unjustly)  that  they  have  gotten 
insufficient professional recognition and then stew in spiteful anger and spout their vitriol in 
the blogosphere, in barbed requests “simply for clarification” in q&a sessions, or behind the 
anonymity of cuttingly dismissive referee reports. 
What is going on in these cases? Much will of course depend on the psychological 
specifics.  We  might  describe  these  agents  as  beset  with  some  combination  of  anger, 
vengefulness,  envy,  resentment.  But  there  is  also,  I  suggest,  a  more  specific  potential 
diagnosis we might want to avail ourselves of as well: namely, ressentiment. 
The notion of ressentiment is of course most famously associated with Nietzsche, who 
made it a key element of his account in his On the Genealogy of Morality. Nietzsche did not 
himself coin the term. Nor did he introduce the notion into philosophical discourse.  But he 1
has perhaps done the most to bring it to the attention of philosophical readers today and to 
contribute to our understanding of the psychology underlying it. His efforts in this direction 
are, to my mind, one of his most important lasting contributions to philosophy. At the same 
 It was in circulation before him in, for instance, the work of Dühring (1865). 1
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time, Nietzsche’s own analysis is closely bound up with his specific project of thinking about 
the genesis and ongoing influence of Judeo-Christian moral values. He thus is less interested 
in giving us a well-delineated theory of what the state in general is (suggestive though his 
remarks may be), than he is instead in charting its relation to this morality, as well as its role 
in forms of internalized self-cruelty. Moreover, since his interests lie with a consideration 
(and in large part an indictment) of this Judeo-Christian morality and its legacy, he focuses 
on the particular cases of ressentiment most relevant to this. In the process, he offers us 
telling examples of it, but they are arguably not the sole, or even the main cases of it. If we 
try to build a general theory of ressentiment just from these, we may be led astray. Specifically, 
we may be mislead into thinking that ressentiment is only the reaction of those under 
conditions of systematic powerlessness and deprivation, or is a reaction which takes only 
repressed, subterranean channels. But that is too limiting. For it is also, I suggest here, 
sometimes the reaction of the comparatively well-off, particularly those with a sense of 
entitlement who feel they aren’t getting their due. And it sometimes expresses itself in 
outward action and turns violent. Many of its most disturbing cases fall into this mould. It is 
potentially an attitude of oppressors as well as of the oppressed, of the powerful as well as 
the powerless, and of many ordinary folk who fall in between. 
Given  the  notion’s  prevalence  within  Nietzsche’s  work,  and  relative  neglect  in 
anglophone moral philosophy, ressentiment has had its most extensive and philosophically-
rich discussion within the orbit of Nietzsche interpretation. This paper will thus begin with 
Nietzsche,  and  engagement  with  the  secondary  literature  on  this  issue.  But  it  is  not 
intended to be mainly interpretive in focus. I instead want to offer a free-standing theory in 
philosophical psychology of what is characteristic of this psychological condition. In the 
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process, I will try to chart the terrain around ressentiment and closely-related and sometimes 
overlapping states (ordinary moral resentment, envy, vengefulness, anger, and the like) and 
also seek to explain what’s ethically objectionable as well as psychologically pernicious about 
ressentiment.  Ressentiment,  I  shall  contend  in  this  paper,  is  not  simply  a  ten  dollar  word 
substitutable for ‘resentment,’ though it is indeed a species of that genus. My account puts a 
particular emphasis on the perception that one has been slighted, insulted, or demeaned as 
at the heart of ressentiment. This, I will suggest, is at least as important in understanding 
ressentiment as powerlessness per se is. Yet the latter, thanks to Nietzsche’s focus on the will to 
power, has tended to guide, indeed monopolize, discussions of ressentiment,  in a way that 
misses a core dimension of the underlying psychology. Likewise, we will miss an important 
element that is distinctive (and conceptually useful) about ressentiment if we take the sole 
function of this notion to be simply descriptive  or explanatory—telling us why an agent is 
having a certain reaction, and what role it plays in her psychic economy. Ressentiment, on the 
view I put forward, is always playing a key normative role as well; it serves to identify and 
censure  a  vice.  In  this  way,  it  is  akin  to  avarice,  cowardice  or  boorishness.  Whereas 
resentment  is  the  genus,  which  has  commendable  and  problematic  manifestations, 
ressentiment,  on my view,  is  an inherently  vicious species  of  it.  Some Nietzsche scholars, 
thinking they are taking their  cue from the great ‘immoralist’  himself,  bend over so far 
backwards to avoid being ‘moralizing’ with their treatment of ressentiment  that they miss 
what,  as  I  see  it,  is  the  core  ethical  function  of  this  concept,  which  is  not  simply  to 
characterize people, but to condemn them as well.  My own account is thus unabashedly 
ethical  in  flavor.  Yet  however  exactly  what  understand this  state  of  ressentiment,  it  is  an 
important and theoretically interesting sub-category that deserves more attention in moral 
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psychology  than  it  gets.  This  paper  is  an  attempt  to  bring  it  to  the  table  for  further 
discussion in anglophone philosophy. 
II. Nietzsche on Ressentiment 
Although there are hints of the idea in earlier work, ressentiment is most extensively 
explored in the first essay of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of  Morality,  and then different 
manifestations of ressentiment are treated in both of that book’s two subsequent essays.  One 2
of Nietzsche’s key claims is that ressentiment is the engine of the so-called “slave revolt” (GM, 
I:10), marking the transformation from a Greco-Roman warrior ethic centered around the 
notions of “good” and “bad” to a Judeo-Christian morality centered on the notions of “good” 
and “evil.” My interest in this paper is not in the role ressentiment is supposed to have played 
in creating or sustaining Judeo-Christian moral values, nor is it in the potential relevance of 
ressentiment  to  a  critical  evaluation  of  such  values.  These  matters  raise  considerable 3
complexities, both exegetical and philosophical. I instead want to try to better understand 
how we might think about this psychological state itself. What is ressentiment? 
I shall begin by looking at what interpreters in the secondary literature have taken 
Nietzsche to mean by this. Most agree that it is referring to a specific mixture of hatred and 
vengefulness.  As mentioned already, this is not simply a term of Nietzsche’s invention. It is 4
a French word, but one that was in circulation among educated German speakers since the 
 See Abbey (1999) for a discussion of its anticipations.  2
 See Bittner (1993); Reginster (1997); Wallace (2007); Poellner (2011) for a discussion of these issues. 3
 For a representative range of readings, see Williams (1993); Bittner (1993); Richardson (1996); 4
Reginster (1997); May (1999); Risse (2003); Janaway (2007); Poellner (2011); Anderson (2011); Leiter 
(2014); Clark (2015); Katsafanas (2016); Elgat (2017); Reginster (Forthcoming).
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17th century.  It was under philosophical discussion in the period right before Nietzsche. 5
Eugen Dühring, a philosopher popular in the 19th century and now mostly forgotten, but 
read,  cited,  and  used  as  a  foil  by  Nietzsche,  makes  use  of  the  term.  Dühring  takes 
ressentiment to be an impulse to retaliate against those we take to have done us some injury.  6
He seeks to explain how this feeling of ressentiment is in fact the source of justice, a project 
Nietzsche finds dubious (GM, II:11).
Though ressentiment may not be a term of Nietzsche’s own invention, some scholars 
read it as basically a term of Nietzschean art, in such a way that it becomes very closely tied 
to the features of the particular examples that Nietzsche probes. Simon May, for instance, 
seeks  to  characterize  Nietzschean ressentiment  and to  distinguish it  from ordinary  moral 
resentment by three features. Ressentiment, as May interprets it, is, first of all, “universal in 
scope,” meaning that it takes not just the isolated actions of others as its object, but all of 
existence. Second, ressentiment falsifies the object of the attitude. And, third, the revenge 
associated with ressentiment  is merely imaginary.  May is correct, I suspect, in saying that 7
these  three  features  can  be  notable  aspects  of  ressentiment  and  are  central  to  some  of 
Nietzsche’s examples. And he is also helpful in reminding us that ressentiment, for Nietzsche, 
is not just an interpersonal matter of animus directed at some person or group; it might take 
God, time, or existence as its object as well. May’s account is moreover insightful in getting 
 There is some degree of disagreement on the precise details here. See Kaufmann (1950), Bittner 5
(1993), and Risse (2003). Risse notes: “Although ‘ressentiment’ is a French word (and thus missing 
from the Grimms’ dictionary), the German educated elite had used it since the 17th century. The 
word was presumably adopted because German lacks a good word for the English ‘resentment’ and 
the French ‘ressentiment.’ (There is the word Groll, which, however, does not characterize a frame of 
mind or an attitude, but tends to arise with regard to a specific event or person.),” p. 164, note 11.
 Dühring (1865). See Small (1997) for discussion. 6
 May (1999), p. 42.7
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us to see better what characterizes some of the forms of ressentiment that Nietzsche has in 
his sights: for example, the ressentiment of those unable to exact actual revenge who might 
“recover their losses” with “imaginary revenge” (GM, I:10) or how ressentiment might involve 
distorting the objects of one’s hatred (e.g., by thinking falsely that they are capable of acting 
otherwise) (GM, I:13). But I think this account ends up being too focused on certain specific 
manifestations of ressentiment to let us bring the more general phenomenon into view. We 
need to allow for the fact that ressentiment, even perhaps by Nietzsche’s lights, can terminate 
in actual revenge. It can involve a clear-eyed apprehension of the object of one’s animus. 
And it needn’t be freighted with existential angst with a universal scope; it can be a more 
focused form of personal hostility unencumbered by this. 
So what can we then say about Nietzschean ressentiment, by way of a more general 
characterization? We might move in the other interpretive direction, and build very little 
into ressentiment. Scott Jenkins, in this vein, interprets Nietzsche as saying that ressentiment 
just is a feeling of vengefulness.  It has, in Jenkins’s view, been overlaid with various other 8
psychological elements by overreaching interpretations. But these elements, according to 
Jenkins,  are  merely  features  of  some  people  who  have  ressentiment,  not  what  the  state 
consists in.  He marshals some good evidence that interpreters have read too much into 
Nietzschean  ressentiment.  But  there  are  two  main  challenges  with  the  quite  minimalist 
alternative reading that he proposes instead. 
The  first  is  that  Nietzsche  is  extremely  negative  about  ressentiment,  but  far  less 
negative about vengefulness in some of its manifestations. Nietzsche, for instance, in the 
Genealogy (GM I:14) cites the Homeric dictum that revenge is “sweeter than honey,” in such 
 Jenkins (2016). 8
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a way as  to  suggest  he has  sympathy with the sentiment.  That  pro-revenge attitude is 9
indeed a central part of the archaic Greek worldview. When someone wrongs you or those 
you care about, you take violent action and savour the outcome of such action.  Achilles 10
kills Hector in revenge for death of Patroclus. Turning the other cheek would be a mark of 
unheroic  weakness.  (Of course,  he  is  unduly  cruel  in  then  abusing  the  corpse,  but  the 
revenge itself was welcome, according to the outlook of the time.) Not all cases of feeling 
vengeful are thus plausibly cases of ressentiment. It is particularly clear in cases like this where 
the revenge is about settling a score for something done to a third party. From Homer down 
to spaghetti westerns to Tarantino, this ethic of revenge is a central cultural strand. If any 
major figure in the modern philosophical tradition should be sensitive to the allure of this, it 
is surely the “immoralist” Nietzsche. While he doesn’t straightforwardly identify his own 
sympathies solely with the warrior ethic he portrays in the Genealogy, he wants to remind us 
that aspects of it still do reverberate, because they were on to something.
A second  main  consideration  is  that  in  various  passages  Nietzsche  mentions 
ressentiment  along  with  but  separately  from various  related  terms,  including  a  feeling  of 
vengefulness,  suggesting  that  they  are  not  just  to  be  identified.  Take,  for  instance,  his 11
remark: “Nothing burns one up faster than the affects of ressentiment. Anger, pathological 
vulnerability, impotent lust for revenge, thirst for revenge, poison-mixing in any sense - no 
reaction could be more disadvantageous for the exhausted…” (EH, “Wise,”  6).  Here the 
“thirst for revenge” is described as one of the affects of ressentiment, suggesting ressentiment is 
 Cf., Staten (1988) on the complexities surrounding the context of this quotation in Homer. 9
 Forster (2011) rightly notes that this is a central element of the archaic Greek ethics that 10
Nietzsche sets against Judeo-Christian morality. 
 I am indebted to Ken Gemes on this point. 11
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not just to be identified with it.  Even if  every case of ressentiment  involves a desire for 12
revenge, it doesn’t follow that every case of a desire for revenge is, in Nietzsche’e eyes, a 
case  of  ressentiment.  The  latter  state  is  apparently  more  specific  in  its  affective  profile, 
reflecting what this feeling of revenge has done to one.  13
If  ressentiment  is  nothing  more  than  a  feeling  of  vengefulness,  then  the  notion 
becomes  deprived  of  much independent  theoretical  interest  in  moral  and  philosophical 
psychology. It is something for which we already had and have a good term. Yet most of us 
who read Nietzsche think he is on to something more specific and psychologically complex. 
Vengefulness is part of that, but not it in its entirety and specificity. I take it that there is 
indeed such a richer notion, and set out to explicate it here. But I don’t have the space in 
this paper to treat all the relevant Nietzschean texts, and thus will not stake much on the 
exegetical issue per se. 
Jenkins,  I  believe,  is  right  that  there  is  a  danger  of  reading  too  much  of  the 
conditions of certain instances of ressentiment back in to the more general notion. Whereas 
May’s reading builds in too much, Jenkins’s reading builds in too little. One potential middle 
ground  is  to  look  more  thoroughly  at  the  psychodynamics  underlying  ressentiment.  This 
psychodynamical direction is the route Bernard Reginster takes in his recent interpretation 
of  Nietzsche.  According  to  Reginster’s  reconstruction  of  Nietzsche’s  view,  ressentiment 14
involves a situation whereby one is in a situation of perceived powerlessness, but one refuses 
 Cf., also A, 45 and GM, III:15. 12
 In this passage, Nietzsche highlights what he takes to be its characteristic effects on health: “such 13
affects involve a rapid consumption of nervous energy, a pathological increase of harmful excretions
—for example, of the gall bladder into the stomach.” (EH, “Wise,” 6). 
 Reginster (Forthcoming). This is different (though in some ways complementary) take to 14
Reginster’s earlier (1997) approach. 
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to  accept  this  powerlessness,  and  takes  various  countermeasures  to  seek  to  restore  the 
feeling of power. Reginster understands this power in broadly formal terms: as a desire for 
what he calls  “effective agency,”  that is,  having the capacity to enforce your will  on the 
world. 
This is a promising account of what underlies a number of cases of ressentiment,  a 
theory  that  has  the  potential  to  shed  light  not  just  on  Nietzsche’s  own examples,  but 
possibly on some of the central ones I began the paper with.  One very helpful feature of 
Reginster’s  account  is  its  focus,  at  the  depth  psychological  level,  on  feelings  of 
powerlessness. A sense of one’s own inadequacy on this front (which one may half admit, or 
not  admit  at  all)  is  indeed often  at  the  heart  of  ressentiment,  even  when ire  is  directed 
outward. The intentional object of ressentiment and its cause (or some of its causes) can come 
apart. Elliott Rodger hated the, in his terms, “stuck up” sorority women who wouldn’t sleep 
with him.  But a deeper cause of his anger may have been his own feelings of emasculated 15
powerlessness, even if this is not primarily how he represented things to himself. 
While I think Reginster is correct to emphasize threats to one’s effective agency, I’m 
concerned  that  his  account  overplays  this  insight.  The  first  problem  with  Reginster’s 
account is that not all instances of the dynamic he describes are plausibly thought of as 
instances of ressentiment. Consider the following cases, involving power in a more localized 
domain: an athlete wants to beat a vastly more talented competitor and is frustrated that he 
can’t. Yet he refuses to give in, and undertakes a training regimen which he knows will give 
him only a small probability of actually besting this competitor. On Reginster’s view, this 
should be a case of ressentiment. But such a person might genuinely admire and respect his 
 See Srinivasan (2018b) and Manne (2017) for discussion of this case. 15
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rival and soldier on cheerfully.  Or consider someone in fact very talented whose prowess is 16
challenged (maybe simply by an upstart competitor with beginner’s luck), provoking feelings 
of inadequacy, but who then shoots 20 straight baskets to reassure himself of his excellence 
and  restore  his  feelings  of  confidence.  He  needn’t  have  any  sort  of  malice  against  the 
upstart. There are versions of these cases with added psychological features that could be 
cases of ressentiment. But Reginster’s account wrongly entails that the very structure of this 
dynamic (challenge to effective agency,  refusal  to accept this,  countermeasure)  is  one of 
ressentiment. The structure is simply too general to characterize ressentiment well.
The  second,  and  more  serious,  problem with  Reginster’s  account  is  about  what 
generates  ressentiment.  On his  story,  powerlessness  plays  that  role.  But  why should it  be 
powerlessness alone? People care about more than just power, understood as merely formal 
effective agency. People also care about status, for instance, being recognized in the eyes of 
others, gaining certain kudos, living up to a certain self-conception, getting coveted goods, 
and so on. These, particularly the concerns around status and recognition, are also fertile 
territory for ressentiment; powerlessness is not the sole cause. Take the case of an extremely 
talented Olympic athlete who performs at her absolute best in diving, but is “robbed,” as we 
might  say,  of  the  Gold  by  unsympathetic  judges.  She  might  then  come  to  feel  deep 
ressentiment  against  them,  against  her  rival,  or  both.  Let  us  suppose  she  remains  highly 
confident in her abilities, and is reassured by the fact that many keen diving enthusiasts also 
share the sense that she was unfairly judged. What will generate her ressentiment is this slight, 
not doubts about her power in this domain. As Nietzsche perceptively recognized, slights 
 I owe this case to Ken Gemes.16
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are often at the core of experiences of ressentiment.  People feel they haven’t gotten their 17
due. We could, I suppose, retell the story with an account about how this is all about a 
desire for power qua effective agency at bottom, or ultimately rooted in insecurities about 
potency. After all, the athlete wasn’t powerful (i.e., effective) enough to prevent or to redress 
this slight. Might that be at the root of her ressentiment? It might well be a contributing and 
exacerbating factor, but it doubtful that this bears the brunt of the explanatory work. The 
reason for that is simple: The very shape of Reginster’s account requires that we care about 
a lot of other things in addition to power-as-efffective-agency (namely, the substantive goals 
we want to achieve as effective agents), and some of these things (esteem in the other eyes 
of others, worldly goods, achievement, and so on) are also things we may care about for their 
own sake.  Why then should threats to power-as-effective agency be the primary or sole 
source of ressentiment? Damages to one’s sense of self worth, being disrespected, not being 
adequately recognized, not getting what one feels entitled to, and so on, seem at least as 
important, if not more important. The account I present in what follows will make these 
kinds of failures more central  to the story.  Ressentiment,  in the first instance, is  a deeply 
intersubjective,  positional phenomenon. We should begin with these easier cases,  before 
turning to the unusual and puzzling cases (ressentiment  against oneself, ressentiment  against 
time) that concern Nietzsche too. 
Reginster must be right that there is some intimate connection between power, as he 
understands it, and ressentiment. But his account is too focused on power to illuminate what 
ressentiment is and what generates it. We need to find some way of supplementing the picture 
 This is evident from his discussion of Mirabeau, offered as a positive example of someone who 17
shrugs off or forgets such slights and thereby avoids ressentiment (GM, I:11). Clark (2015) highlights 
this dimension of Nietzsche’s account relating to one’s being slighted, p. 66.
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by drawing on other features of the agent's psychological economy and outlook. Ressentiment 
has  a  more  specific  psychological  profile.  I’m  doubtful  Nietzsche  himself  has  really 
explained it. But he has given us an intuitive sense of some of the sort of people he has in 
mind,  and  some  extremely  penetrating  observations  about  their  psychology.  These  are 
instances of the broader phenomenon that is of interest in this paper, not its full extent. 
By way of summary in this section, there are four key misconceptions about ressentiment that 
we get from overgeneralizing from the particular cases that Nietzsche offers us (especially in 
GM I) and assuming that the features of those cases apply to ressentiment in general.
First, it is sometimes thought, based on Nietzsche’s main examples, that ressentiment 
arises just among the weak and powerless.  But, on closer inspection, this is not his view 
(Cf., GM, 1:11). It can also, he thinks, arise among those who are not powerless (in any thick 
or interesting sense), but who feel they have been slighted or injured. This can be a feature 
of the comparatively well-off, the “noble,” the “strong.” There thus needn’t be conditions of 
structural deprivation or powerlessness.18
Second, it is sometimes thought that ressentiment involves vengefulness that has been 
repressed.  It of course can. Those who maintain this are often thinking of Nietzsche’s 19
telling examples of those who preach Christian love, but deep down really feel  vengeful 
hatred, and who cannot be honest with themselves about their malicious feelings. But not 
all cases of ressentiment are like this. The agent beset with ressentiment  needn’t mask from 
 This cuts against a widespread view, which links ressentiment in Nietzsche closely (maybe 18
essentially) to powerlessness, e.g., see Scheler (1915), Richardson (1996), p.61, Wallace (2007), Janaway 
(2007), p. 81, Leiter (2014). It is of course true that powerlessness is a key feature of (much of) the 
ressentiment thematized in GM I, and to that extent these readings are right. But I agree with Jenkins 
(2016) at least in thinking that we should not assume this powerlessness to be a feature of ressentiment 
in general.
 Cf., Reginster (1997), p. 286. (Reginster’s current view has moved away from this commitment). 19
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himself  the fact that he is  in this condition through mechanisms of self-deception. The 
anger and vengeful urges can also be knowingly suppressed for prudential reasons, or indeed 
can remain at the forefront of consciousness. When either happens, it does not thereby 
necessarily cease to be ressentiment.20
Third, it is sometimes thought that ressentiment terminates in or is somehow bound 
up with value creation or revaluation.  Nietzsche gives us a world historical example where 21
he claims that it does so. The priestly people, on the story he tells in the Genealogy, take 
revenge by overturning the nobles’ values and instituting a new set of “slavish” values with 
mass appeal (GM, I:10). But in many other, more ordinary cases, ressentiment doesn’t involve 
this. It operates, and festers, against the backdrop of a stable set of values. 
Fourth, it is sometimes thought that ressentiment needs to be a standing feature of 
character. Nietzsche will  talk, for instance, of venomous people of ressentiment,  those for 
whom this deep-seated disposition colors their way of looking at and being in the world. I 
think he’s  right  that  there  are  such people.  But  ressentiment  on his  view can also  be an 
episodic state (GM I:11) in addition to a structuring orientation to the world. I think he’s 
right to think that also. It can be a condition that one is in, but that one gets over, as one 
might get over a fit of rage or jealousy. We, in my view, need to understand both sorts of 
cases, and not assume that ressentiment is just the deep-seated thing, or that the deep-seated 
thing is  the only philosophically-interesting phenomenon. As a methodological  matter,  I 
 There is a more subtle question about whether the agent feeling ressentiment can represent to 20
herself that this is the state she is feeling. Many are self-deceived, but this not impossible among the 
psychologically self-aware. Indeed, one of Nietzsche’s many goals in the Genealogy is presumably to 
get his readers to be more self-aware (GM, “Preface,” 1) about precisely these sorts of elements that 
continue to operate in our own psychology today. On this theme, see Gemes (2006). 
 Cf., May (1999), p. 44.21
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think we get ressentiment  more clearly in to view when we focus first  on the episode of 
ressentiment. That is because it is a good first step in understanding people of ressentiment to 
think that they are people disposed to being in this sort of state. We of course might also 
delve deeper into their psychodynamics and say more to try to explain why that is (e.g., their 
deep feelings of inadequacy, powerlessness, or what have you, and their ways of coping with 
these). But we won’t get very far if we start with the supposed psychodynamics of people of 
ressentiment and then try to understand episodes of it, since many episodes may be had by 
people who don’t share that speculative underlying psychology.
Nietzsche has put his finger on something psychologically distinctive that is not just 
in a quasi-mythic, quasi-historical past of priests, nobles, and the slave revolt, but is a key 
element continuing to operate in human psychology in a pervasive way. He himself further 
emphasizes this point, noting its ongoing operation today: “this plant [of ressentiment] now 
blooms most beautifully among anarchists and anti-Semites—in secret, incidentally, as it has 
always bloomed, like the violet, albeit with a different scent” (GM, II:11). This, of course, is 
stinging verbal irony; ressentiment’s scent is not “beautiful,” but repulsive. 
What I shall try to do in the next section is to develop an account of ressentiment, 
building on some of the lessons from this section, but in a way that is not meant to be 
simply or primarily Nietzsche exegesis. He has a rhetorical tendency to oversalt his prose 
with  coarse  modal  claims  (e.g.,  in  the  quotation  above,  that  ressentiment  has  “always 
bloomed” “in secret”). Maybe. Other things Nietzsche says seem to be in some tension with 
that. But we don’t, for the purposes of this paper, need to terminate discussion in parsing 
Nietzsche’s specific remarks. In this way, my disagreement with the Nietzsche interpreters 
mentioned in this section is in places possibly less sharp than it might seem; their goal is to 
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report and reconstruct how this term function’s in Nietzsche’s oeuvre, and in doing so, to 
make sense of various of Nietzsche’s apparent commitments. I think there are still some 
purely  exegetical  challenges  with  their  respective  readings.  But  insofar  as  we  want  an 
interpretation of Nietzsche, we might emphasize various interpretive virtues of an account 
over others: the best rational reconstruction of the term given the role it is supposed to play 
throughout the three essays of the Genealogy for instance, or what the historical individual 
Friedrich Nietzsche himself understood or likely meant by the term, or what he literally says 
on the page, or perhaps something else still. I don’t offer a developed, alternative reading of 
Nietzsche by any of these metrics. I will take some guidance from Nietzsche, but my focus 
is  on  saying  what  I  think resssentiment  is  and  what  use  this  notion  has  for  us  in  moral 
psychology today. 
III. A Theory of Ressentiment 
It is clear enough that ressentiment is, in certain respects, akin to a “reactive attitude,” 
in the sense of that term we get from P.F. Strawson.  But we can’t understand it simply by 22
focusing on the conditions that precipitate it—whether a perceived injustice,  a slight to 
one’s status, a frustrated feeling of powerlessness, a condition of systematic deprivation or 
one of profound and unremediated suffering. Nor can we focus simply on what one wants to 
do in response to this—namely, to strike back in vengeance, or in some way to mount a 
demonstration or achieve a reassurance of one’s power. A story about ressentiment,  in my 
view, is going to need to be holistic, seeing what the reactive attitude does (or can do) to the 
agent who has it.  We thus need to see how this condition fits in to the agent’s broader 
 Strawson (1962). 22
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psychological economy in order to see whether it rises to the level of a case of ressentiment. 
In  what  follows,  I  will  explore  the  import  of  two  metaphors  we  get  from Nietzsche, 
centering  on  how ressentiment  has  a  tendency  to  “poison”  one  and  to  make  one  ugly.  23
Exploring these ideas, in conjunction with refining some other characteristics, will help us 
see what ressentiment  is, how it operates, what distinguishes it from closely-related states, 
and, finally, why it is problematic. 
A review of the secondary literature on Nietzsche has given us the direction in which 
to look. But the accounts we looked at were either too unspecific or too specific. On the 
“too unspecific” side: They were capturing as ressentiment cases that intuitively are not, or 
they were not telling us enough about its psychological specificity. On the “too specific” 
side: they were generalizing too much from the particularities of Nietzsche’s examples, or 
assuming that powerlessness is the key to ressentiment. Although Reginster goes in the right 
direction  in  thinking  about  the  psychodynamics  of  ressentiment,  he  focuses,  arguably 
following Nietzsche, on the operations of the will to power as his principal explanatory tool. 
This,  in my view, is  too monistic,  and understates how the concern for recognition and 
status are equally, if not more, prominent in cases of ressentiment. I shall set out my account 
of ressentiment,  and then proceed to expand on each of the main conditions and then to 
defend it from some potential objections. 
Ressentiment is a state of the psyche involving: 
 On poisoning, see GM, I:10. The poisoning aspect is also highlighted by Scheler (1915). On 23
ugliness, it a less a matter of a direct assertion to this effect, but rather in the flavor of imagery (e.g., 
“cellar rodents” (GM I:14), “deformed” “worm-eaten” (GM III:14)) that Nietzsche uses to portray 
those beset with ressentiment. Such imagery is of course multi-faceted, and gets at various other 
features of the state too. 
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i) suffering and anger in relation to
ii) a perceived injury, slight, or undesirable state of affairs 
iii) that one feels to be have been perpetrated on one.
iv) One resents ii)/iii) and often regards ii)/iii) as unjust or unfair
v) and one moreover perceives ii)/iii) as insulting or demeaning. 
vi) On account of i)-v), one desires vengeance.
The overall effect, in cases of ressentiment, is that: 
vii) the features described above have a tendency to “poison” the agent and to make him/her 
“ugly.”
The lynchpin here is condition vii), and I will elaborate on it metaphors shortly. But let me 
turn to elaborating the conditions of ressentiment in the order set out above. Ressentiment is, 
first of all, characterized by a negative phenomenology. If there is an injury or a slight or an 
unfortunate condition that I don’t know about, or don’t care much about, it is not going to 
be the occasion for ressentiment. It has to, on some level, make me angry and make me suffer, 
etc. Hence i).
Ressentiment is provoked by something, and frequently (though not always) takes this 
as its target. This spark can be an isolated incident (e.g., Maria got the promotion, and John 
didn’t), or a more standing condition (e.g., John is upset that no one respects or appreciates 
his philosophical contributions). Often it is a combination of the two, where a particular 
incident might tap into deeper and more pervasive feelings of inadequacy, indignation, or 
frustration. Sometimes, the cause of the ressentiment  and its intentional object may come 
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apart. John might have ressentiment  about Maria’s promotion, but the cause (or at least a 
major cause) of the ressentiment is (let us suppose) his own feelings of inadequacy (which he 
may or may not fully admit to himself). Likewise, an agent may have ressentiment in reaction 
to what he merely perceives to be a slight, but which in fact isn’t. (Perhaps he mishears or 
misinterprets a compliment as an insult.) Ressentiment is thus a reaction to a ii) perceived 
injury, slight, or undesirable state of affairs. 
Ressentiment is a three-way relation. There is the agent with the ressentiment, the state 
or incident it is in response to, and the putative perpetrator on whom his ire fixates. This 
perpetrator iii) is the felt cause of the state or incident that the agent is reacting to. The 
agent feeling ressentiment needn’t think of the perpetrator in particularly agential terms.  He 24
might have ressentiment against someone that he doesn’t take to be morally responsible, or 
even aware of what he or she is doing. The putative perpetrator can also be a corporate or 
non-human entity (a company, nation, even God). The point is that the problematic state or 
incident is not simply regarded as an unfortunate state of affairs; it is a constitutive part of 
ressentiment  that blame is sought somewhere. The person with ressentiment  feels,  on some 
level,  that  the  state  or  incident  is  traceable  to  this  perpetrator.  The connection to  the 
alleged perpetrator, it must be stressed, is often tenuous, illogical, or entirely non-existent. 
(Someone might be upset about his declining standard of living and the loss of his job, and 
blame  “immigrants”  for  that.)  Sometimes,  this  blame  may  be  out  of  step  with  one’s 
conscious, reflectively-endorsed beliefs, but one feels it to be the case even so. One might 
thus have ressentiment toward that conspicuously successful person even though he has not 
led in any appreciable or intelligible way to the unfortunate (or often—let’s be realistic—
 Cf., Strawson (1962) on resentment. 
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very moderately less fortunate)  state one finds oneself  in;  what will  make this a case of 
ressentiment  instead of just envy is in part the primitive unconscious logic of this sort of 
blame. To further illustrate the centrality of such blame, take the case of the accomplished 
runner, who loses his legs in an accident. Unless there is a target of his anger in the form of a 
felt perpetrator (whether an agent, a group, or a more abstract entity [e.g., that corporation] 
on whom blame is placed), it is not going to be a case of ressentiment. If one truly just accepts 
(both theoretically, and at a more affective or unconscious level) that it is a freak occurrence, 
one  is  not  going  to  have  ressentiment,  though  one  may  have  a  range  of  other  negative 
emotions (e.g., despondency, depression). Hence, I submit, condition iii). 
Often, ressentiment will bring to bear a normative framework in the agent’s thinking 
as well. Although the idea of the perpetrator is basically just a causal one, the agent with 
ressentiment will also typically feel that something unjust or unfair has been done to him. I 
stress this point because ordinary moral resentment and ressentiment can overlap a great deal. 
It is sometimes wrongly supposed that they must be distinguished sharply; if thoughts of 
morality or justice enter the picture, then it becomes a case of moral resentment and is no 
longer ressentiment.  But this is wrong; they are not mutually exclusive. Cases of resentment 25
can be (or can turn into)  cases of ressentiment  depending on how these feelings of moral 
indignation and the like operate within the agent’s psychological economy. It’s striking, in 
fact, how often the vocabulary of justice or fairness gets appealed to by agents of apparent 
 Cf., May (1999), Reginster (Forthcoming), Ch. 4. It might be thought that ressentiment, on 25
Nietzsche’s account, preexists (and in fact precipitates) morality; therefore, morality and thoughts of 
justice can’t figure into the psychology of ressentiment. Even simply as Nietzsche exegesis, this 
conclusion is unwarranted. First, there can be normative thoughts of justice (fairness and unfairness, 
desert, blame, etc.) that are not part of the Judeo-Christian framework that, according to Nietzsche, 
arises with the slave revolt. Second, even if specifically moral thoughts don’t figure in all instances of 
ressentiment, such as those preceding the slave revolt, that has no bearing on whether they figure in 
some later instances of ressentiment. 
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ressentiment.  This happens  even when the notion of justice or fairness being employed is 
highly warped, or reflective of a perverse and inappropriate sense of entitlement. Elliott 
Rodger’s constant refrain centers around these notions; these women ought to be having sex 
with him, yet aren’t. In his twisted way, he perceives this to be unfair and unjust.  While 26
notions  of  justice  often  play  a  central  role  in  the  agent’s  thinking,  ressentiment  needn’t 
necessarily involve such thoughts. Someone might slight you by saying that your philosophy 
talk or the meal you cooked was not very good. Suppose this is a case where the person is 
not knowingly giving offense, maybe saying this in a way that is not gratuitously mean, in a 
situation where you accidentally  overheard.  You might agree with their  assessment,  and 
their assessment might be true, but you might still feel the occasion for ressentiment.  Hence 27
iv).
Ressentiment is not a matter of just any sort of injury, however. It, I suspect, involves 
injuries, slights, or standing conditions that represent an affront. The basic idea is that the 
injury, slight, or standing state of affairs insults or demeans your worth, either as a person 
full stop, or in some more specific role, particularly one that you care very much about (e.g., 
being  an  accomplished  philosopher  or  sportsperson).  Hence  v).  Suppose  someone  says 
something cutting about my philosophical acumen. That may be a source of worry. But I will 
not feel similarly about my basketball talents, such as they are, being denigrated, because I 
have no such talents, and don’t care about having them. For others, matters may be reversed 
with philosophy and basketball. Places where social hierarchies are in play are especially ripe 
for ressentiment.  Yet although we often (tempted by Nietzsche’s  main examples)  think of 
 See Srinivasan (2018b) and Manne (2017) for discussion of this case. 26
 I owe this sort of example to Elgat (2017). 27
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ressentiment  as  exclusively  tied to a  backdrop of  such power dynamics  and disparities,  it 
needn’t be. It also characterizes situations where people are at or near the very top of the 
pecking order, and feel that this is not being adequately respected. Take the case of the 
sulking Achilles, which seems to me to be a central instance of ressentiment. He feels that the 
prize of Briseis should have gone to him, yet he has been unfairly deprived by Agamemnon. 
He’s  not  doubtful  that  he  deserves  her.  He  believes  he  does,  and  that  is  partly  what 
precipitates his spectacular episode of ressentiment that we get at the beginning of the Illiad. 
Or consider the white supremacists, or the proverbial well-off Trump voter. They might feel 
ressentiment  toward people they think are encroaching on their territory, getting “uppity,” 
lazy moochers getting things they don’t deserve. (Whether it is an instance of ressentiment 
will depend on the specifics of the case, which we are not always in a good position to judge; 
all the real-world examples I give are governed by that proviso.) It is important to remember 
that although ressentiment is most often felt toward those one perceives to be higher in the 
pecking order, it can also be felt toward those one perceives to be lower, or toward one’s 
perceived  equals.  Threats  to  status,  elevation  of  others  to  what  one  regards  as  an 
inappropriate status, and deprivation of what one thinks one is due on account of one’s 
status can figure centrally in ressentiment.
Salient as well will be a desire for revenge. This is one way in which moral resentment 
begins to come apart from ressentiment. In the more admirable cases of moral resentment at 
least, one might seek an apology, or protest the unfair situation or behavior and seek to 
change it through exhortation, corrective action, and the like. But in ressentiment, one wants 
the putative perpetrator to suffer. Often, one wants to cause this suffering oneself, but one 
can  also  be  satisfied  with  the  putative  perpetrator  simply  getting  a  comeuppance. 
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Ressentiment will often involve vivid fantasies about such revenge (Cf., GM, I:15). Sometimes 
these are consciously entertained on the part of the agent, as in the case of the embittered 
narrator in Dostoevksy’s Notes from Underground. Sometimes they are unacknowledged by the 
agent, who claims to love his neighbor as himself, but still gets the thrill of schadenfreude, 
under  the  guise  of  the  triumph of  “justice.”  If  we  focus  a  great  deal  on  the  examples 
Nietzsche  gives  in  GM I,  we  might  think  ressentiment-filled  agents  are  those  who  are 
constitutionally  powerless  and  incapable  of  taking  real  revenge,  so  make  due  with 
compensatory  substitutes  only.  This  certainly  is  characteristic  of  some  agents  with 
ressentiment. But others who are capable of revenge refrain from it for seemingly prudential 
reasons (Achilles not killing Agamemnon, for instance). And some actually do take revenge, 
whether in the form of petty passive aggression or in savage violence or in something in 
between. This may or may not dissipate their underlying ressentiment. In any event, this desire 
for revenge figures prominently. Hence vi).
Yet  wanting  revenge  is  not  sufficient  for  ressentiment.  There  are  cases  of  seeking 
revenge where none of the freight of ressentiment may be involved (perhaps Achilles wanting 
and  taking  revenge  against  Hector,  discussed  above).  What  is  crucial  to  making  it 
ressentiment is what it does (or threatens to do) to you. The best way of understanding that 
problematic dimension, I believe, is through two images we find in Nietzsche: Ressentiment 
has  a  tendency to  poison you,  and it  makes  you ugly.  The image of  poisoning suggests 
psychic harm to the agent suffering from it, and a threat to those nearby. The image of 
ugliness suggests the state’s inherently rebarbative quality. Both metaphors underscore the 
fact that ressentiment is a vice of character, and give us further clarity about why it is so.
How does this poisoning metaphor capture how ressentiment is harmful to the agent? 
   of  24 36
This mainly suggests the way it can tend to impair functioning through its potential for 
distorting effects on the rest of the psyche.  Its obsessive quality might, in some cases, steal 28
energy from other tasks. Its retrospective focus might, in some cases, lead one to dwell on 
past slights rather than planning for the future. The self-deception it sometimes involves 
might undermine one’s integrity as an agent.  Its emphasis on violence might lead the agent 29
to  outright  self-destruction.  The  other  dimension  of  the  poisoning  metaphor  is  its 
interpersonal  toxicity. People beset with ressentiment  can make whole environments around 
them “toxic”  too,  whether  by  fostering  ressentiment  in  others,  or  simply  by  creating  an 
insalubrious and unpleasant atmosphere. When faced with people of ressentiment, we often 
want to keep a cordon sanitaire.
Note,  in  the  case  of  poisoning,  the  emphasis  on  “tendency.”  This  points  to  a 
dispositional feature of it, or, perhaps more precisely, of conditions i)-vi) taken together).  30
In  cases  of  ressentiment,  there  is  a  tendency  toward  the  poisoning  of  the  psyche.  The 
dispositional hedge is important because there are various ways in which such conditions 
and  feelings  can  potentially  be  dealt  with—processed,  as  it  were—so  that  this  doesn’t 
happen, or so that its potentially ill effects are diminished. An agent might be energized by 
his ressentiment, “own” it, draw sustenance from it, and on. Those cases are more rare, but 
they are another reason its poisoning dimension needs to be thought of in disposititional 
terms. In most cases of ressentiment,  however, particularly those of a longer duration, the 
disposition is likely to be manifested and the agent is in fact poisoned by it. This will be 
 This sort of poisoning is not unique to ressentiment. We can be poisoned by jealousy, envy, etc. 28
 This point is developed well in Reginster (1997). 29
 Ressentiment (the full package) also itself poisons, because of its tendency to exacerbate through 30
self-perpetuation. 
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particularly correlated with and exacerbated by the agent’s powerlessness. 
Perhaps  the  more  crucial  metaphor,  however,  is  that  of  making one ugly.  It  is  a 
metaphor at least in the sense that the way in which one is ugly needn’t be a matter of sheer 
visual appearance. It can be. But it primarily meant to be getting at an ugliness of soul, an 
aesthetic-ethical  way  of  couching  a  certain  (judgment  about)  a  defect  of  character.  The 
metaphor is capturing, in part, how the condition of ressentiment is taken to be an inherently 
bad state for the human psyche to be in. But that’s not all. The image at the same time is 
also getting at something more specific, namely that the state in question is found to be 
repulsive.  Not all inherently bad states have that quality. The ugly condition of those with 31
ressentiment casts a pall on their interactions with others.32
To judge that someone is beset with ressentiment  thus involves thinking that he is 
manifesting an ugliness of soul (at least in this episode, if not in general). But on what basis 
does one make this judgment? What psychological characteristics license it? There is not, I 
believe,  an  informative  answer  to  this  question,  if  what  one  is  in  search of  are  further 
features that give necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the application of this metaphor 
in the service of normative assessment. The cases of ugliness of soul just are the cases where 
this metaphor is (judged) apt to describe the agent in question, and it will depend on the 
specific form that conditions i)-vi) take in his/her case. That makes the notion somewhat 
unsatisfying perhaps, but this fuzziness is precisely to be expected, given my account: It 
reflects the fact that the charge of ressentiment is necessarily bound up with a (potentially 
contentious)  normative judgment that a specific vice is  being manifested in the state in 
 Cf., Poellner (2011)31
 The repulsive quality of ressentiment can also be fascinating, one reason we are drawn to ressentiment-32
laced Twitter feeds, even as we find them loathsome and rebarbative. 
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question.  Akin  to  “cowardice”  or  “boorishness,”  it  identifies  a  psychological  condition 33
(judged) worthy of disapprobation.
To say that ressentiment is an objectionable psychic condition, or a vice or defect, is 
not to deny that it can have good effects. It might be conducive to creativity. It might make 
one work all the harder to prove oneself. Give one a certain energy. And so on. It’s in general 
true of defects or vices that they can have this structure of potential benefit (to oneself, and 
to the broader world) as well as harm. A enduring lesson from Nietzsche is that it is rare for 
things to be wholly good or wholly bad. Thanks to ressentiment,  humanity, he claims, has 
become deeper and more interesting (GM, I:6). Ressentiment’s complex effects are bound up 
in a  way that  is  very  difficult  to disentangle.  But  that  said,  there is  always  going to be 
something pro tanto  bad about the state of ressentiment and something ethically defective 
about an agent in this state. 
It is a defect of character even where the target of ressentiment is, in some sense, an 
appropriate target of the reactive feelings.  Even in cases where the anger is justified, or 
morally justified, my view explains why there is something problematic about slipping into 
ressentiment  itself. Consider certain kinds of social justice warriors. They might be wholly 
right. The target of their criticism is blameworthy, deserving of censure and so on. But in 
some cases, they have slipped from righteous anger into a toxic, ugly condition. We should 
be careful not to conflate ressentiment and anger, however. In some circumstances, anger is 
the entirely appropriate emotion to have. Some philosophical positions rooted in Stoicism 
 Does this mean there is no ‘fact of the matter’ about whether it is a case of ressentiment? Not 33
necessarily. It will depend on one’s background views about whether the agent’s normative judgment 
is sensitive to objective normative features of situation, or is instead imposing her outlook on it. I’m 
neutral on this issue, and thus, on whether there is really is ‘ugliness of soul,’ or simply judgments to 
that effect, without any objective backing.  
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try to dissuade us from anger entirely. They claim it is a destructive emotion that we should 
avoid. It clouds our epistemic rationality, makes us less sensitive to considerations of justice, 
exacerbates psychic tension within ourselves.  Amia Srinivasan in my view rightly points 34
out that these Stoic and neo-Stoic treatments of anger conflate the issue of whether anger is 
apt and whether its effects are good.  It can be assessed along both dimensions. My own 35
view on the topic is what we might describe as neo-Aristotelian. Anger is an appropriate 
emotion in certain circumstances. There is something meritorious about the agent who feels 
the  appropriate  amount  of  anger  in  the  appropriate  degree  in  the  appropriate 
circumstances. There is, prima facie at least, something wanting in the agent (the doormat, 
for instance, or the utterly affectless person) who fails to feel anger when such anger is called 
for. One who is opposed to ressentiment needn’t be opposed to anger in all its forms. For 
while  ressentiment  involves  anger,  not  all  anger  involves  ressentiment.  One  important 
distinction between anger and ressentiment is that anger needn’t be bound up with a desire 
for revenge. The angry agent, for instance, might just want a sincere recognition of the harm 
caused and an apology from the wrongdoer, or steps taken to remedy the underlying issue in 
the future. Yet like resentment, anger can slide into the territory of ressentiment. We all know 
of angry people who just can’t “let go,” who felt appropriate anger initially, but continue to 
nurse the grievance well beyond that point. These are sometimes cases of ressentiment. The 
most pernicious forms of ressentiment are those that are no longer episodic responses to a 
 The locus classicus is Seneca, De Ira [On Anger]. See Nussbaum (2001) and (2014) for a 34
contemporary treatment in a neo-Stoic spirit. Nussbaum is not against strong emotions in general, 
but thinks there is something especially problematic about anger in particular. 
 Srinivasan (2018a). 35
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particular incident but become one’s default orientation toward the world.  36
Of course, angry agents can often be challenging to be around as well, and general 
discomfort on the part of others needn’t be a consideration against their justified anger. It 
might be good, and appropriate, that they make others upset by, for instance, drawing an 
attention to an injustice that is difficult to face. The mere fact that the emotion makes one 
difficult to be around doesn’t settle whether it is ressentiment or a manifestation of anger that 
is not a form of ressentiment. Whether it is ressentiment depends on the psychology of the 
agent (and a normative judgment about it), and observers can be highly fallible (as well as 
biased) judges of what state the agent is in. A rush to label a state as ressentiment can be a way 
of unduly dismissing its legitimacy and avoiding a confrontation with a view, a point, or a 
person that one doesn’t want to deal with. 
So far, I’ve presented an account of what I take ressentiment to be. But what’s to say 
that the state I’ve identified is appropriately described as “ressentiment”? The objection might 
run as follows: I’ve strayed too far from Nietzsche. The term, this thought continues, only 
really makes sense in the context of Nietzsche’s work and the examples he gives us. That 
determines its meaning. In response, I would say that Nietzsche has no proprietary claim on 
this notion. It was in discourse before him, and it now has resonances of its own (which 
Nietzsche played a key, though not exclusive,  role in shaping.)  Moreover,  we should not 
suppose that a great deal in my account turns on the word per se. I have tried to argue that 
this is an important category, or sub-category, that we should think more about. I want to 
illuminate a particular psychological condition, with which I take it most of us are familiar. 
“Ressentiment” is, in my opinion, the best candidate term we have for this state, but the state 
 See Wallace (2007), Leiter (2014), and Huddleston (2017) for further elaboration of this distinction 36
between episodic ressentiment and being a ‘person of ressentiment.’ 
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has  been  around  a  great  deal  longer  this  term.  One  way  of  trying  to  reinforce  the 37
appropriateness of the term “ressentiment” is to see how what I’m describing is distinct from 
closely-related  states  such  as  anger,  resentment,  envy,  and  schadenfreude.  Now,  it  bears 
noting that a given agent at a given time needn’t be, exclusively, in one of these states. A 
given person is often feeling a mixture of these emotions. But I’ve tried to say what I think 
is distinctive about the psychological profile of ressentiment and the role of this notion in 
moral psychological discourse. 
Resentment and ressentiment are related as genus to species. Although all resentment 
involves (i)-(iii), and often can involve (iv), it needn’t involve being insulted or demeaned (v), 
the desire for revenge (vi), the poisoning of the psyche or the agent being made ugly (vii). 
Instead of wanting revenge, and being grotesquely contorted by your feelings, you can be 
indignant, you can want an apology, you can want to work with the person to improve his 
behavior, you can respond with cool dignity to slights, you can turn the other cheek, or you 
can simply be depressed about the whole situation. In some of the morally admirable cases 
of resentment, one looks on the other second-personally, as a kind of moral equal, an agent 
to whom such grievances might be addressed. This is not the dynamic of ressentiment.  But 38
cases  of  resentment  can  degenerate  into  ressentiment,  and  when  conditions  vi)  and 
particularly vii) are met, this is the sign that such degeneration has happened.
The issues of self-worth, entitlement, and status that I suggest are in play when it 
comes to ressentiment can suggest important similarities to envy. Many cases of ressentiment of 
 If one insisted on using some other word— say “rancor” or “embitterment” or “aggrievement”—37
little of substance in my account would be lost. Even so, to my ear, those words don’t have quite the 
same flavor. There is inherent desire for vengeance in ressentiment (whether repressed or at the 
surface) that these words perhaps needn’t carry.
 Darwall (2013). 38
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course involve envy as well. Envy, in general, involves wanting something that someone else 
has–the nice car or the good looks or the professional success,  say.  This might involve 39
suffering from the lack of it. But one needn’t resent the situation, or regard it as unjust, or 
demonize the possessor of the coveted good. Such envy needn’t involve a desire for revenge 
either.  Thus, fairly obviously, not all cases of envy are cases of ressentiment. But not all cases 40
of ressentiment are cases of envy either. Consider the (reasonably well-off) “white nationalist.” 
He needn’t be envious. But he nonetheless thinks that there is a threat to his power and 
status.  Others  are  getting  something  they,  in  his  view,  don’t  deserve.  That  provokes 
ressentiment, but needn’t involve envy. Ressentiment can look a lot like schadenfreude too. But 
in  cases  of  schadenfreude,  one  needn’t  perceive  an  injury  or  a  slight  or  a  standing 
unfortunate condition. One can be perfectly well-off and feel the frisson of schadenfreude. 
Not every case of schadenfreude is a case of ressentiment. Nor is every case of ressentiment a 
case of schadenfreude. Ressentiment involves a desire for revenge; in cases of schadenfreude, 
the focus is on savoring the already-actual misfortune of the other, sometimes when it is 
perceived  as  a  deserved  comeuppance.  There  are  further  important  distinctions  to  be 41
drawn among these psychological notions, despite there being considerable overlap. My aim 
here has been to try to give us some help in marking off the state of ressentiment. Ressentiment, 
I’ve tried to suggest, is a concept that helps us illuminate an important and objectionable 
psychological condition. But that is not what is most distinctive and useful about it. After 
all, we could do much (maybe all) of the psychologically descriptive work with our existing 
 See Protasi (2017) for a helpful account of envy. 39
 Cf., Wallace (2007) distinguishing ressentiment from envy. 40
 Watt Smith (2018) offers a good characterization of schadenfreude and a range of excellent 41
examples. 
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notions,  such as anger and resentment. Its role,  I’ve suggested, is  not just to describe a 
psychology, but to condemn it. Whereas the previous terms are (for most, anyway) neutral, 
ressentiment functions as a vice term. 
IV. Conclusion  
The seeds of the view I put forward here are present in Nietzsche, but what I offer is 
not  clearly  Nietzsche’s  view.  That  said,  it  is,  I  believe,  not  incompatible  with the main 
thread of Nietzsche’s position either. But this paper is not a work of exegesis. If we focus 
too much on Nietzsche, this may lead us to an artificial restriction of the term to confine 
ourselves to thinking just about Nietzsche’s own sorts of examples, rather than some of the 
most powerful contemporary examples surrounding us. This, I think, would be a shame, if 
we want to understand the broader phenomenon. 
Some of the examples cited as cases of ressentiment may fall into disputed territory, 
particularly from those who take Nietzsche as their main point of guidance. Those wedded 
to a narrower view of ressentiment may thus bristle about this extension. I have, in reply, tried 
to  suggest  in  this  paper  that  the  cases  in  question  form an  interesting  class,  and  that 
ressentiment  is  the  best  term  we  have  for  describing  such  cases.  Perhaps  inevitably,  a 
philosophical account is going to impose more regimentation on a term like this than we 
have in our ordinary usage of it.  I  am, for my part,  not simply trying to report on our 
present use of the term (and of course, many of us don’t now use it!), though I think many 
examples of our usage support the line I want to take. Sometimes, for instance, the terms 
   of  32 36
“resentment”  or “anger” are used in cases where “ressentiment” might also apply.  On my 42
view, this is accurate, but not as specific as we might want to be. We might have good reason 
for being more specific in some cases, but also for refraining from being more specific in 
others—for example, where we are talking in a broad way about large groups, or aren’t in a 
position to opine on the psychology of the individual agents themselves. That is one reason 
I describe my real world cases cautiously, as potential instances of ressentiment. Likewise, we 
may not be trying to describe a psychological condition, but also to indict it as a vice. This is 
further reason we may want to employ ressentiment. 
As so often in philosophy, we find ourselves with the term “ressentiment” operating in 
a productive interplay between how we do use a term and how we might use it. A similar 
sort  of  interplay  marks  the  literatures  surrounding  guilt,  shame,  jealousy,  envy.  Their 
boundaries are not as clear-cut as we might like. With all of these states just mentioned, 
however,  we  have  far  more  philosophical  resources  for  thinking  about  them and  their 
operations. I think we need greater such resources when it comes to ressentiment. This will 
help us understand ourselves and each other better as agents—not simply as rational agents, 
but as agents who are sometimes gripped by feelings that are deeply nasty. As Nietzsche says 
at  the  beginning  of  the  Genealogy,  we  “knowers”  are  “unknown”  to  ourselves.  (GM, 
“Preface,” 1). It is difficult to admit that we  (collectively) can be like this. But admitting this 
 For example, Faludi (1991), discussing gender issues, and Anderson (2016), discussing race issues, 42
sometimes use the term “resentment.” This seems to me the right move in that they are discussing 
wide social trends. But ressentiment may be characteristic of many of the (typically white male) agents 
involved. 
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is a step forward to self-knowledge.  43
 My thanks to Ken Gemes, Jack Spencer, Béatrice Han-Pile, Sebastian Gardner, and Tom 43
Dougherty for correspondence on this piece, to the participants in the Birkbeck Nietzsche Seminar 
and the Birkbeck Philosophy Works in Progress Seminar, and to an audience at the University of 
California, Riverside, from whom I received very useful feedback. 
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